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ABSTRACT
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES AND WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Cristiano M. Costa
Kenneth I. Wolpin
This dissertation develops and estimates a structural dynamic model in which indi-
viduals decide among participation in extracurricular activities, study time, and em-
ployment during high school. The specication allows for returns to participation in
extracurricular activities on salaries and unobserved heterogeneity in studentsprefer-
ences over study time, extracurricular activities, employment during high school and
the acquisition of a bachelors degree. The model is estimated using a selected sample
of 1,875 white males from NELS88. The objective is to evaluate quantitatively the
consequences of public policies that eliminate the opportunity for students to partic-
ipate in extracurricular activities and policies that give payments to students if they
obtain higher test scores. Results of counterfactual experiments show that policies
that eliminate extracurricular activities in high schools decrease studentstests scores,
college graduation rates, and future wages, while policies that give payments based
on test scores increase scores and the percentage of students who obtain bachelors
degrees.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the United States, more than 70% of high-school students participate in athlet-
ics or school clubs on a weekly basis.1 Participation in extracurricular activities is
often linked to higher test scores, educational attainment, and future income.2 For
example, average test scores of students who participate in athletics or clubs are 7.5%
higher than scores obtained by students who do not participate. On average, 51%
of students who participate in athletics or clubs during the four years of high school
obtain a bachelors degree, while this rate is only 24% among those who do not partic-
ipate. Frequent participants in extracurricular activities earn about 20% more than
nonparticipants eight years after high-school graduation.
One potential explanation for these di¤erences is that participation in extracur-
ricular activities facilitates the development of non-cognitive skills (motivation, lead-
ership, self-esteem, etc.), which are not well measured by academic test scores or
1All statistics in this paragraph are based on a sample of 7,131 students from the National
Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88) for which all information was available. Please
refer to Section 3 or to the Appendix for details about the denitions and construction of variables.
2Recent economic literature reports positive e¤ects of participation in extracurricular activities on
test scores, educational attainment, and wages during adulthood. See, for example, Lipscomb (2007),
Barron, Ewing and Waddell (2000), Eide and Ronan (2001), Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman
(2004), and Kuhn and Weiberger (2005).
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schooling measures, like years of education. Recent studies have shown that involve-
ment in extracurricular activities is related to higher aspirations for the future, the
likelihood of avoiding the development of antisocial behavior problems, and low levels
of depression and anxiety (Mahoney, Larson and Eccles, 2005). Studies also report
that participation is associated with a greater desire to help others, higher self-esteem
and better decision-making skills (Miller, 2003).
At the same time, the literature on the technology of skill formation reports that
non-cognitive skills promote the development of cognitive skills (Cunha and Heckman,
2007; Cunha and Heckman, 2008). For example, there is evidence that programs that
focus on the acquisition of non-cognitive skills are associated with increased engage-
ment in learning and test scores during adolescence (Miller, 2003). These results point
to a complementary e¤ect of the acquisition of non-cognitive skills on outcomes usu-
ally related to cognitive skills, like test scores. For example, skills learned in school
clubs, like assertiveness or critical thinking, may improve academic performance. Ad-
ditionally, research shows that non-cognitive skills directly inuence schooling deci-
sions and wages during adulthood (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). Finally,
skills like teamwork, leadership, and motivation are frequently listed as very impor-
tant on employersdescriptions of necessary qualications for jobs in todays economy
(Murnane and Levy, 1996).
If participation in extracurricular activities actually helps the development of non-
cognitive skills, the decision to participate in sports and school clubs can be inter-
preted as an investment. One would expect the student to anticipate future benets
and take them into account when deciding to participate in extracurricular activities.
The decision depends not only on expected future outcomes, but also on students
preferences. Spending time on extracurricular activities takes time away from other
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activities, such as studying, working and leisure. Students face a trade-o¤ between
investing in non-cognitive skills (extracurricular activities) and investing in cognitive
skills (study time) during high school.
In this context, public policies that emphasize academic achievement (test scores),
may ignore the important role of non-cognitive skills in the formation of cognitive
skills.3 These types of policies may induce students to spend more time studying
and doing homework and less time participating in extracurricular activities. Also,
policies that reduce the availability of sports and clubs during high school may reduce
studentsopportunities to acquire non-cognitive skills valuable later in life. To capture
the result of such policies accurately, hwoever, a model of high-school decision-making
has to take into account the fact that students will change their choices once an
extracurricular activity is no longer available and may compensate for this lack of
opportunity by studying more or acquiring more working experience. Therefore, to
estimate the potential consequences of such policies a model must account for the
nature of the students choices during high-school years and its consequences for
future outcomes, like college graduation and wages during adulthood.
This article develops and estimates a structural dynamic model in which high-
school students make decisions concerning study time, participation in athletics, par-
ticipation in clubs, and employment during high school. Students face a time con-
straint, which leads to trade-o¤s among their choices. They derive utility or disutility
from the activities on which they spend time (study, extracurricular activities and
work) and derive utility from leisure. After graduation, students decide either to enter
3In particular, there is evidence that non-cognitive skills promote the formation of cognitive
skills, but, in general, the opposite is not true (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Additionally, research
suggests that non-cognitive skills are easier to acquire at later ages than cognitive skills (Carneiro
and Heckman, 2003).
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the labor market or to obtain a bachelors degree and postpone entrance into the labor
market for four years. The model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in students
preferences, ability to take exams, and productivity in the labor market. Students
choices during high school a¤ect outcomes throughout their lives, such as standardized
test scores, wages during high school and salaries during their adulthoods. Preferences
and outcomes are a¤ected by individual shocks that are observed by the students but
unobserved by the econometrician. The specication allows for di¤erent returns to
participation in extracurricular activities on salaries for those holding a bachelors
degree and for those with a high-school diploma. This feature captures the idea that
non-cognitive skills, acquired through participation in extracurricular activities, may
be more important at certain educational levels than at others.
The economic literature on the e¤ects of participation in extracurricular activities
on wages during adulthood is relatively sparse. Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman
(2004) investigate the relationship between participation and future wages using a
sample of white males from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Re-
sults from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates show a wage di¤erential of about
9% in adult wages for those who participate in athletics and 3% for those who partici-
pate in clubs, after controlling for ability (AFQT) and schooling measures. Kuhn and
Weiberger (2005) use data on white males from the Project TALENT, the National
Longitudinal Study of 1972 (NLS-72) and High School and Beyond (HSB) to estimate
the e¤ects of leadership positions during high school on wages during adulthood. Re-
sults from di¤erent OLS estimates show that students who participate in sports and
school clubs receive a wage di¤erential between 2% and 10%, while those who were
also team captains or club presidents receive additional wage premiums ranging from
zero to more than 20%.
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Because participation in extracurricular activities is a choice, a simple regression
of wages on participation in athletics and clubs may lead to a biased estimator, due
to self-selection.4 To control for endogeneity of participation in athletics, Eide and
Ronan (2001) use height as an instrument for athletic participation. After controlling
for high-school characteristics, family income, and other observables, the e¤ect of
participation in athletic activities on adult wages is not statistically signicant for
a sample of white males from the HSB survey. Barron, Ewing and Waddell (2000)
use high-school enrollment and measures of health, family income, and location as
instruments. The authors control for ability (AFQT), years of education and other
individual characteristics and report wage premiums of about 4% for males in the
NLS-72, but the e¤ect is not statistically signicant for students in the NLSY cohort.
The authors point out that these results depend on the quality of the instruments for
athletic participation that they use.
In order to account for potential endogeneity problems and to assess the conse-
quences of di¤erent public policies, the model developed in this article is structurally
estimated using a sample of 1,875 white males from the National Educational Lon-
gitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88). This survey is particularly informative because
it contains information about studentsparticipation in athletic activities (baseball,
basketball, football, soccer, swimming, and other team and individual sports) and in
school clubs (band, dramatic or musical, government, newspaper, and service clubs)
for more than one period. Students were interviewed when they were sophomores
(1990) and again when they were seniors (1992). Subjects also answered questions
4Suppose, for example, that students who are more productive in the labor market are also the
ones who derive higher utility from participation in sports, due to some unobserved characteristic.
Then, a simple OLS regression of wages on participation in sports would overestimate the e¤ects of
participation in sports on wages, and lead to biased results.
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about their post-secondary education and work experience later in life (in 1994 and
in 2000). The is structured in a dynamic discrete-choice model framework and is
estimated using the Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) method.
Results show that participation in athletics is estimated to increase wages in adult-
hood up to 6.7% for individuals with a bachelors degree and up to 4.2% for those with
only a high-school diploma. The wage premium for participation in school clubs is es-
timated to be up to 5.7% for college graduates and 3.9% for those with a high-school
diploma only. These results are similar to those found in the previous literature.
Because the model is structural, these estimates are already free of potential biases
caused by unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection. We can then conclude that
the labor market is willing to pay more to workers with these kinds of experience.
The amount of experience accumulated in each activity directly impacts the choice
of educational level (bachelors degree or high-school diploma only), because experi-
ences a¤ect future wages in each educational level di¤erently. Unobserved heterogene-
ity in studentspreferences play an important role on determining who participates
in school activities. In particular, estimates of the utility parameters indicate that all
activities are costly (parameters are negative) but are more costly for certain groups
of students. Those with strong preferences for clubs derive lower utility levels from
participating in sports, but their disutility from studying is the lowest among all
types. Therefore, this type of student tends to participate more in clubs, and, be-
cause the payo¤s for such experience are more valuable after obtaining a bachelors
degree, this type of student anticipates that and attends going to college more often
than the average student.
Estimates also show that test scores increase with study time and participation
in clubs and decrease with participation in sports and work. These results can be
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interpreted as evidence that skills acquired thriugh clubs help the development of
cognitive skills, as measured by test scores, while skills acquired through athletic
activities or part-time jobs are detrimental to the acquisition of cognitive skills and
result in lower test-score levels.
Having estimated the parameters governing preferences and outcomes, it is possi-
ble to evaluate the impact of changes in public policies on choices during high school,
the choice of educational level, and wages during adulthood. Four di¤erent poli-
cies are analyzed. The rst three experiments investigate the e¤ects of eliminating
clubs, athletic activities, and both types of activities simultaneously. These policy
experiments aim to measure the long-term consequences of recent proposed cuts in
high-school budgets, which usually have extracurricular activities as prime candi-
dates for cutbacks. Results show that public policies that eliminate expenditures in
extracurricular activities may lead to lower test scores, fewer students obtaining bach-
elors degrees, and lower wages during adulthood. The fourth experiment intends to
estimate the consequences of policies that transfer income to students who perform
better in exams, in the same fashion as policies recently implemented in Chicago,
Washington, and New York. Results show that a policy that pays 700 dollars to
every student who obtains a score above the median of the test distribution increases
test score and the number of students obtaining bachelors degrees.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the dynamic-decision
model and the estimation strategy, Chapter 3 describes the NELS88 sample used in
the empirical analysis, and Chapter 4 presents the results of the structural estimation.
Chapter 5 provides the results of four policy experiments, and Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Model and Estimation Strategy
This Chapter presents a dynamic-choice model in which high-school students make
decisions on how to allocate their time among study, work, and extracurricular activ-
ities. These choices a¤ect their current utility in each period of high school and lead
to trade-o¤s during those years. The decisions may a¤ect their test score results, and
the experience accumulated in each of these activities during high school a¤ects the
studentspost-secondary schooling decisions and their wages during adulthood.
2.1 Timing
The model has three periods, t = 1; 2; 3. The rst period corresponds to a students
rst two years of high school: freshman and sophomore years. He chooses how to
allocate his time among study, work, and extracurricular activities. At the end of
the rst period, he observes the outcomes of his choices: test scores and wages, and
accumulates experience in extracurricular activities and work. In the second period,
which corresponds to the last two years of high school, junior and senior years, he
again chooses among the same options as in the rst period and observes the resulting
outcomes. In the third period, the student decides whether to enter the labor market
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or obtain a college degree. The third-period utility is the sum of all future wages
after leaving high school. If the student decides to obtain a college degree, the direct
benet/cost is added to his utility, and his entry into the labor market is delayed by
four years.
2.2 The Choice Set
During high-school years (t = 1; 2), the choice set consists of four binary decisions:
study (dts 2 f0; 1g), participation in athletics (dta 2 f0; 1g), participation in clubs
(dtb 2 f0; 1g); and work (dtw 2 f0; 1g): Upon nishing high school (t = 3), the student
decides whether to enter the labor market (dc = 0) or to obtain a college degree
(dc = 1). In the rst and second periods, the decision set allows for sixteen (16 = 24)
mutually exclusive and exhaustive choices. In the third period, there are only two
alternatives.
2.3 The State Space
Working and participating in extracurricular activities build skills in the form of
cumulative experience. The transition function is deterministic and is simply the
sum of the past decisions. For any k = a; b; w: et+1k = e
t
k + d
t
k: The initial experience
(e1k) is assumed to be equal to zero for all students. For example, participating in
athletics and working in the rst period, (d1a; d
1
b ; d
1
w) = (1; 0; 1); and participating in
athletics and clubs while not working in the second period, (d2a; d
2
b ; d
2
w) = (1; 1; 0), will
yeld cumulative experience of (e3a; e
3
b ; e
3
w) = (2; 1; 1). While time spent on working and
participating in extracurricular activities accumulates over time, study time does not.
In the rst and second periods, individuals receive random utility shocks that
shift their utility levels of studying, participating in athletics and clubs, and working.
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These shocks should be understood as individual choice-specic characteristics that
are related to the utility of joining the activities but are not observed by the econo-
metrician. The four random shocks are known by the students at the time they make
their decisions. The individual shocks are drawn from a multivariate normal distri-
bution and are allowed to be correlated within periods, (uts; u
t
a; u
t
b; u
t
w)
0  N(0;):
The diagonal elements are denoted 2s , 
2
a, 
2
b , and 
2
w; and covariance elements are
sa, sb, sw, ab, aw, and bw. The matrix  is assumed to be same in periods
one and two. In the third period, students also receive a choice-specic shock (uc);
which is assumed to be normally distributed, uc  N(0; 2c ). Additionally, students
face shocks on their wage o¤ers during high school: t  N(0; 2t). This shock is
assumed to be observed by the students before they decide. Over the rst and second
periods, students also face a shock (t) on their test scores, which is not known to the
students before they decide how to allocate their time and is assumed to be normally
distributed, t  N(0; 1).
The state space for an individual i at time t; 
(i; t), describes the accumu-
lated experience (eti  (etai; etbi; etwi)0), current-period utility shocks uti (where uti 
(utsi; u
t
ai; u
t
bi; u
t
wi)
0 for t = 1; 2; and u3i  (u3ci)), wage o¤er shock ti , and the scores
in the previous period, gt 1i . Hence, the state space for individual i at time t is

(i; t) =

eti; u
t
i; 
t
i ; g
t 1
i
	
, and g0i =  for all i:
2.4 Outcomes
While in high school, individuals receive wage o¤ers that are assumed be constant and
independent of studentsskills and choices. The wage o¤ers in the rst two periods
(t = 1; 2) are modeled as the sum of a constant term and an individual-specic shock:
wti = exp(w
t + ti);
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where wt is constant across students at time t and ti is the individual-speci com-
ponent of the wage o¤er at time t. The shock is known by the students when they
decide whether to work.
The test score result for student i in period t is a function of his decisions,
dti = (d
t
si; d
t
ai; d
t
bi; d
t
wi)
0. This is the mechanism by which students transform their
experiences or skills learned in extracurricular activities, into cognitive skills (test
scores). This specication allows for positive and negative direct e¤ects. For exam-
ple, participation in the newspaper club may increase studentstest scores because
they learn how to manage time better or it may decrease scores because students get
confused with some parts of the material learned in class because they were focused
on memorizing lines for a play to be presented in the drama club.
The test score process also depends on a stochastic component (ti) unknown to
the student and assumed to be independent over time and across individuals. Scores
in the second period are allowed to depend on scores in the rst period to account
for accumulated knowledge.
Students take exams in the rst period and receive a score, g1i , which is assumed
to follow the process:
g1i = 11d
1
si + 12d
1
ai + 13d
1
bi + 14d
1
wi + 
1
i ;
where |1 = (11; 12; 13; 14) is a vector of parameters and 
1
i is a shock to test scores.
What is observed, however, is the nal score, g1i , which is assumed to be discrete and
ranges over integervalues from one to four. Therefore, the process can be modeled as
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an ordered probit:
P (g1i = 1) = 
 
11   |1d1i

P (g1i = 2) = 
 
12   |1d1i
    11   |1d1i 
P (g1i = 3) = 
 
13   |1d1i
    12   |1d1i 
P (g1i = 4) = 1  
 
13   |1d1i

;
where 11, 
1
2; and 
1
3 are parameters such that 
1
1 < 
1
2 < 
1
3; d
1
i = (d
1
si; d
1
ai; d
1
bi; d
1
wi)
0;
and (:) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Because the student does
not know 1i at the beginning of the period and the shock is normally distributed, he
infers that the probabilities of receiving the scores as described above. In the second
period, scores are allowed to depend on the rst-period scores, and the process is
given by:
g2i = 20g
1
i + 21d
2
si + 22d
2
ai + 23d
2
bi + 24d
2
wi + 
2
i ;
where 2i is also independent and normally distributed, 
2
i  N(0; 1). Probabilities
over the second-period scores are also modeled as an ordered probit as described
above, but with parameters 21, 
2
2; and 
2
3:
In the nal period, students decide between two alternatives: enter the labor
market or obtain a college degree. These choices lead to two di¤erent wage proles.
The wage proles for each educational level, high-school diploma (HS) or college
degree (C), depend on second period scores, experience in athletics, clubs and work,
and age (a). The wages (WHS and WC) are assumed to be log-normally distributed,
and each include random components unknown by the student when nishing high
school.
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The wage prole faced by individual i at age a is written as follows:
WHS (i; a) = exp(HS0 + 
HS
1 (a  18) + HS2 (a  18)2 + HS3 g2i + HS4 Ife3ai=1g
+HS5 Ife3ai=2g + 
HS
6 Ife3bi=1g + 
HS
7 Ife3bi=2g + 
HS
8 Ife3wi=1g + 
HS
9 Ife3wi=2g + "
HS
i (a))
for a  18
and
WC (i; a) = exp(C0 + 
C
1 (a  22) + C2 (a  22)2 + C3 g2i + C4 Ife3ai=1g
+C5 Ife3ai=2g + 
C
6 Ife3bi=1g + 
C
7 Ife3bi=2g + 
C
8 Ife3wi=1g + 
C
9 Ife3wi=2g + "
C
i (a))
for a  22
where HS and C are vectors of parameters and Ifx=yg is an indicator function
that equals one if the statement in braces is true and zero otherwise. The shocks
on wages to high-school graduates ("HSi (a)) and to college graduates ("
C
i (a)) are
assumed to be independent across individuals and ages and normally distributed:
"HSi (a)  N(0; 2HS) and "Ci (a)  N(0; 2C).
2.5 Preferences and Students Problem
In the rst and second periods, students choose how to use their time, dti = (d
t
si; d
t
ai; d
t
bi;
dtwi)
0. They derive utility/disutility from each these four activities. They also derive
utility from consumption (cti) if they work and from leisure (l
t
i); which is measured
as the time available after choosing dti. Test scores (g
t
i) do not give immediate utility
but a¤ect future outcomes, such as second-period scores and wage proles after high-
school graduation (WHS and WC).
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The problem of student i in period t; for t = 1 or 2, is:
max
fdtig

Ut(c
t
i; l
t
i; d
t
i;
(i; t)) + 
2EVt+1(
(i; t+ 1)jdti;
(i; t))
	
s:t: dti 2 f0; 1g4
cti = w
t
id
t
wi
lti = 4  dtsi   dtai   dtbi   dtwi
where Ut is the utility in period t,  is the discount factor, and Vt+1 is the utility
in all subsequent periods, which will be dened in the following paragraph.1 The
contemporaneous utility at t is:
Ut(c
t
i; l
t
i; d
t
i;
(i; t)) = c
t
i+ 
t
p
lti+(
t
1+u
t
si)d
t
si+(
t
2+u
t
ai)d
t
ai+(
t
3+u
t
bi)d
t
bi+(
t
4+u
t
wi)d
t
wi
where  t is a parameter that represents the preference for leisure in period t, t is a
vector of parameters that assign the direct utility of enrolling in an activity in period
t, and utsi, u
t
ai, u
t
bi, and u
t
wi are random shocks that shift the utility/disutility levels.
The features of the utility function are easy to interpret. The utility is measured
in monetary terms because it is linear in consumption. The preference for leisure is
concave, so the marginal utility of leisure is decreasing. The fact that leisure is linear
in dti implies that the disutility that comes from decreasing leisure time by one unit is
the same for all four activities, and it is transformed into monetary terms by  t: It is
also important to mention that the expected continuation value depends not only on
the distribution of the future utility and wage o¤er shocks but also on the distribution
of shocks to scores during period t, which is unknown to the student at period t.
In the third period, students have nished high school and choose whether to enter
the labor market or to obtain a college degree and enter the labor market four years
1The next-period expected value is discounted at the rate 2 because each of the rst two periods
is equivalent to two years in the data.
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later. If students decide to enter the labor market, their utility values are equal to
the expected discounted value of the future wages, E(V HSi ). If they decide to obtain
a college degree, their utility value will be the utility/disutility of attending college 
C

plus the expected discounted value of the future wages, E(V Ci ). This utility is
also a¤ected by a shock on preferences (uci) that is known by the student by the time
he has to make his choice. The students problem in the third period is:
V3(dci;
(i; 3)) = max
dci2f0;1g
fE(V HSi ); C + E(V Ci ) + ucig
where
E(V HSi ) = E
P65
a=18
(a 18)WHS (i; a)

E(V Ci ) = E
P65
a=22
(a 18)WC (i; a)

The utility/disutility of attending college
 
C

should be understood as the sum of
all pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and benets from attending a four-year college.
When deciding between the two educational paths, students do not know the
realizations of future shocks on wages. Therefore, they make their decisions based
on the expected discounted values of both educational wage proles. They know,
however, the wage prole parameters and the distribution of the shocks, and have
su¢ cient information to calculate the expected value of the two options. The wage
functions can be rewritten as
WHS (i; a) = exp(HS1 (a  18) + HS2 (a  18)2) exp(HS0 + HS3 g2i + HS4 Ife3ai=1g
+HS5 Ife3ai=2g
+ HS6 Ife3bi=1g + 
HS
7 Ife3bi=2g + 
HS
8 Ife3wi=1g + 
HS
9 Ife3wi=2g) exp("
HS
i (a))
for a  18
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and
WC (i; a) = exp(C1 (a  22) + C2 (a  22)2) exp(C0 + C3 g2i + C4 Ife3ai=1g
+C5 Ife3ai=2g + 
C
6 Ife3bi=1g + 
C
7 Ife3bi=2g + 
C
8 Ife3wi=1g + 
C
9 Ife3wi=2g) exp("
C
i (a))
for a  22:
This leads to the following simplication:
WHS (i; a) = 'HS(a) exp(HS0 + 
HSXi) exp("
HS
i (a)) for a  18
and
WC (i; a) = 'C(a) exp(C0 + 
CXi) exp("
C
i (a)) for a  22;
where
'HS(a) = exp(HS1 (a  18) + HS2 (a  18)2)
'C(a) = exp(C1 (a  22) + C2 (a  22)2)
HS = (HS3 ; 
HS
4 ; 
HS
5 ; 
HS
6 ; 
HS
7 ; 
HS
8 ; 
HS
9 )
C = (C3 ; 
C
4 ; 
C
5 ; 
C
6 ; 
C
7 ; 
C
8 ; 
C
9 )
Xi = (g
2
i ; Ife3ai=1g; Ife3ai=2g; Ife3bi=1g; Ife3bi=2g; Ife3wi=1g; Ife3wi=2g)
|:
Hence, it is possible to rewrite the expected discounted value as:
E

V HSi

= exp(HS0 + 
HSXi)
P65
a=18
(a 18)'HS(a)E

exp("HSi (a))

E

V Ci

= exp(C0 + 
CXi)
P65
a=22
(a 18)'C(a)E

exp("Ci (a))

Because the wage errors, "HSi (a) and "
C
i (a); are normally distributed, the terms
exp("HSi (a)) and exp("
C
i (a)) are log-normally distributed.
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As a result, E[exp("HSi (a))] = exp(
2
HS=2); and E[exp("
C
i (a))] = exp(
2
C=2):
Therefore, the expressions can be written as:
E

V HSi

= exp(HS0 + 
HSXi + 
2
HS=2)
HS
E

V Ci

= exp(C0 + 
CXi + 
2
C=2)
C
where HS =
P65
a=18
(a 18)'HS(a) and C =
P65
a=22
(a 18)'C(a): The values of HS
and C are direct functions of ; HS1 ; 
HS
2 ; 
C
1 and 
C
2 ; they are not additional para-
meters.
2.6 Solution Method
The model is solved by backward induction. In the last period students know the
relevant information to make their decisions at each state point (
(i; 3)). The optimal
decision (dci) maximizes the lifetime value V3(dci;
(i; 3)). Knowing these maximum
alternative-specic value functions for every element of the state space at the third
period, we can integrate over the utility shock (uci) to obtain the expected maximum
alternative-specic value function (EV3(
(i; 3)) for each element in the state space at
the beginning of period three.
At the beginning of the second period, the students know the relevant information
(
(i; 2) and EV3(
(i; 3)); at each attainable 
(i; 3)) to make their decisions. In this
period, however, before computing the optimal decision, a student needs asses the
probability of each test score outcome to form beliefs about the expected value of
the utility in the third period, as each decision at the beginning of the second period
a¤ects the distribution of scores at the end of the second period. After integrating
over the test score shock (2i ); students have all the information they need (including
EV3(
(i; 3)j
(i; 2); d2i ) for all d2i ) to make their decisions in the second period at each
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state point (
(i; 2)).
In the rst period, they calculate the maximum alternative-specic value function
for every element of the state space at the second period V2(
(i; 2)) and integrate over
the test score shock (1i ) and second-period shocks (u
2
i ) to obtainEV2(
(i; 2)j
(i; 1); d1i ):
Given this information, a student chooses the alternative that maximizes his expected
utility.
2.7 Estimation Strategy
The model is a three-period multinomial choice problem and can be estimated using
the Simulated Maximum Likelihood method. The method consists of obtaining the
so-called Emax values for periods two and three by simulating the errors given the set
of parameters and then using these Emax vakues to calculate the likelihood. There
are, however, two minor complications in the process: (i) the errors on test scores are
not known before the decision is made, and (ii) there is no closed form solution for
choice probabilities in the rst and second periods.
The rst complication a¤ects the way the Emax values are calculated. Since
test scores are known only at the end of the period, Emax values are calculated in
two steps. In the second period, EV3(
(i; 3)) is obtained by calculating the utility
value at each state point, which includes the scores (g2i ); via simulation
2, and af-
ter that integrating over the four possible nal scores (g2i = 1; 2; 3; or 4) to obtain
EV3(
(i; 3)j
(i; 2); d2i )). The probability of each score level, however, has a closed
form solution. This procedure is also used in the rst period.
The second complication (no closed form solution for the choice probabilities)
2The Emax values were calculated using 200 draws. For each state point and draw, the maximum
utility is calculated. For each state point, the Emax value is simply the average of the maximum
utilities over the 200 draws.
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requires the use of a simulator for the calculations of the probabilities. The method
consists of drawing many sets of shocks for each student, calculating the values of the
utility function in each draw, and calculating the probabilities of each possible choice
given the observed state point and expected future values.3
Since shocks are independent across time, the likelihood function can be written
as the product of within-period outcome probabilities:
L(jy; x) =QIi=1Q3t=1P (y(i; t)j; x(i; t))
where  is the vector of parameters, y is the set of all observed decisions/outcomes, and
x is the set of all observables (past decisions). P (y(i; t)j; x(i; t)) is the probability of
observing the decisions and outcomes y(i; t) for the individual i at period t, conditional
on the vector of parameters  and the observation of x(i; t).
The decisions/outcomes are y(i; 1) = [d1i ; w
1
i ; g
1
i ]; y(i; 2) = [d
2
i ; w
2
i ; g
2
i ] and y(i; 3) =
[d3i ;Wi]. Notice that, if the student chooses d
3
i = 0; then we observe W
HS(i; a = 26)
and if d3i = 1; then we observe W
C(i; a = 26)4. The observables are such that
x(i; 3) = [e3i ; g
2
i ], x(i; 2) = [e
3
i ; g
1
i ]; and x(i; 1) = ;:
In the last period, the conditional probability is:
P (y(i; 3)j; x(i; 3)) = P (d3i ;Wi(a = 26)j; e3i ; g2i )
= P (d3i j; e3i ; g2i )P (Wi(a = 26)j; e3i ; g2i ; d3i )
3The method used in this article is a logit-smoothed AR simulator, as in Train (2003, Chapter
5.6.2). This simulator was originally suggested by McFadden (1989). Ben-Akiva and Bolduc (1996)
call it a "logit-kernel probit," when applied to a probit model. The smooth-simulated probabilities
for the rst and second periods were calculated based on 200 draws. The smoothing parameter, ;
was set to be equal to 500. Please refer to Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) for an example of use of this
simulator.
4In NELS88, the dataset used in the estimation, the only infomation available about wages after
high school is when students are 26 years old. This issue is discussed in Chapter 3.10.
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= Ifd3i=1gP (
C+E

V Ci

+uci > E

V HSi
 j; e3i ; g2i )P (Wi = WC(i; a = 26)j; e3i ; g2i ; d3i )
+Ifd3i=0gP (E

V HSi

> C+E

V Ci

+ucij; e3i ; g2i )P (Wi = WHS(i; a = 26)j; e3i ; g2i ; d3i ):
The probability is calculated by rst calculating the values of E

V HSi

and E

V Ci

for which there are closed-form solutions5. After that it is possible to calculate P (C+
E

V Ci

+ uci > E

V Hi S
 j; e3i ; g2i ) and P (E V Hi S > C + E V Ci  + ucij; e3i ; g2i );
using the cumulative normal distribution, since uc  N(0; 2c ): The probabilities
P (Wi = W
C(i; a = 26)j; e3i ; g2i ) and P (Wi = WHS(i; a = 26)j; e3i ; g2i ) also have a
closed-form solution, the density of a standard normal distribution, since "Hi S(a) 
N(0; HS
2) and "Ci (a)  N(0; 2C).
In the second period the likelihood contribution does not have a closed-form so-
lution. The probability is:
P (y(i; 2)j; x(i; 2)) = P (d2i ; w2i ; g2i j; e2i ; g1i )
= P (g2i j; d2i ; w2i ; e2i ; g1i )P (d2i ; w2i j; e2i ; g1i )
= P (g2i j; d2i ; w2i ; e2i ; g1i )P (d2i j; w2i ; e2i ; g1i )P (w2i j; e2i ; g1i ):
where P (g2i j; d2i ; w2i ; e2i ; g1i ) is obtained from an ordered probit, P (w2i j; e2i ; g1i ) comes
from a standardized normal density and P (d2i jw2i ; e2i ; g1i ; k) is simulated using shocks
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. The simulation, however, has to take
into account the fact that the econometrician observes the realization of the shock
on wages, 2i = ln(w
2
i )   w2; for those who worked in period two, as it a¤ects the
individual utility.
5The probability P (d3i ;Wij; e3i ; g2i ) can be rewritten as P (d3i j; e3i ; g2i )P (Wij; e3i ; g2i ; d3i ) because
the decision to attend college does not depend specically on the errors on Wi(i; a = 26): Hence,
observing Wi(i; a = 26) does not change the probability of P (d3i j; e3i ; g2i ): This happens because we
can write both E

V Ci

and E

V HSi

in a closed form solution that is a function of the wage prole
parameters, and not of its future errors.
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The rst-period contribution to the likelihood is:
P (y(i; 1)j; x(i; 1))) = P (d1i ; w1i ; g1i j)
= P (g1i j; d1i ; w1i )P (d1i ; w1i j)
= P (g1i j; d1i ; w1i )P (d1i j; w1i )P (w1i j):
and the procedure is the same as in the second period.
It is important to remember that the Emax values for the future periods are re-
quired for the calculations of P (y(i; 2)j; x(i; 2)) and P (y(i; 1)j; x(i; 1))): Hence, the
recursive method to maximize L(jy; x) proceeds as follows: (1) choose the starting
values for the parameters and distribution of types, (2) calculate the Emax values
using the frequency simulator method, (3) calculate L(jy; x), and (4) use a maxi-
mization method to nd a better set of parameters and distribution of types. Repeat
the steps from (1) until the likelihood is maximized.
2.8 Unobserved Heterogeneity
To allow for unobserved di¤erences in preferences, test-taking ability, and labor mar-
ket ability, assume that type 1 individuals are characterized by the following vector
of parameters:
[11 ; 
1
2 ; 
1
3 ; 
1
4 ; 
2
1 ; 
2
2 ; 
2
3 ; 
2
4 ; 
C ; w1; w2; 11; 
1
2; 
1
3; 
2
1; 
2
2; 
2
3; 
HS
0 ; 
C
0 ];
which was previously dened. The other types (k > 1) are dened by their di¤erences
relative to type 1.
For k > 1, a student of type k will have parameters
21
tjk = 
t
j + jk for t = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2; 3; 4
Ck = 
C + 5k
wtk = w
t + 6k for t = 1; 2
tjk = 
t
j + 7k for t = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2; 3
HS0k = 
HS
0 + 8k
C0k = 
C
0 + 9k:
Hence, students may have di¤erent levels of direct utility from each decision (1k;
2k; 3k; 4k), including the utility/disutility from a college degree (5k). They may
also di¤er in their productivity when working during high school (6k), in their ability
to take test (7k), and in productivity in market work determinated by each of the
two educational levels during adulthood (8k; 9k).
Although heterogeneity is unobserved by the econometrician, it is assumed that
there are K types. Also, it is assumed that each type k is observed with proportion
k in the sample, such that
PK
k=1 k = 1; and k > 0; 8k: In this version of the
model the number of types is set to be equal to four, K = 4. Therefore, allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity adds 27 (= 9 3) parameters to the model, as we use type
1 as the base type. Also, the proportions of each type (1; 2; and 3) add 3 more
parameters to the model.
Unobserved heterogeneity leads to a slightly di¤erent likelihood function. The
likelihood in this case will be a nite mixture of type-specic likelihoods:
L(jy; x) =QIi=1PKk=1kQ3t=1P (y(i; t)j; x(i; t); k):
The advantages of this method are its simplicity and exibility. The unobserved
heterogeneity is modeled using 27 parameters to capture di¤erences in preferences,
ability in test-taking, and market productivity. If one tries to capture these charac-
teristics using observables, like family background variables, it would require 9 times
the number of observed variables. The model leads to a exible distribution of types,
as it does not impose a parametric assumption on the distribution of types.
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Chapter 3
Data
This Chapter describes the sample used in the empirical estimation and the methods
by which variables are created from the original survey. Descriptive statistics are pre-
sented, as are the results of OLS regressions. Data restrictions and the identication
of the model are explained in the nal section of the Chapter.
3.1 Sample
The model is estimated using a selected sample from the National Educational Longi-
tudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88). The study is a nationally representative sample of
eighth graders surveyed in 1988. Students were interviewed four more times: in 1990,
1992, 1994, and 2000. They responded to questions on a range of topics including
school, work, and extracurricular activities. The NELS88 also collected information
about certain outcomes during their adulthood, including the highest educational
level obtained and wages.
The nal sample used in this article includes all white men1 who attended 10th
1The estimation uses only white individuals to avoid measuring wage di¤erentials that could be
correlated with race. Also, the sample excludes women to prevent measuring di¤erentials caused by
decisions related to childbearing.
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grade in 1990, 12th grade in 1992, studied in the same institution throughout high
school and obtained a high-school diploma by 1994. The sample also excludes in-
dividuals who studied in schools where sports and clubs were both not available.
After dropping individuals with missing information, the nal sample contains 1,875
individuals.
3.2 Variables
While NELS88 has the drawback of not having many waves after high-school gradua-
tion, it contains detailed information about studentsparticipation in extracurricular
activities. Among many other questions concerning their choices, students answered
questions about the use of their time, including (i) the number of hours per week
usually spent doing homework outside the classroom, (ii) participation in organized
athletic activities, (iii) participation in organized school clubs, and (iv) number of
hours per week spent working. Using this information, discrete variables were cre-
ated as follows.
The variable study (ds) is set equal to one if the time spent doing homework
out of school is greater than ve hours per week, and zero otherwise. The variable
participation in athletics (da) is set equal to one if the student participated in at least
one school-organized sport (baseball, softball, basketball, football, soccer, swimming,
or others). If the student did not participate in any sport, the variable is set equal
to zero. The variable participation in clubs (db) is set equal to one if the student
participated in at least one school-organized club (band/orchestra, theater/musical
clubs, student government, newspaper/yearbook, or school service clubs). If he did
not participate in any of these clubs, the variable is set to zero. The variable work
(dw) is set equal to one if the student was employed and reported working more than
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ten hours per week during high school and zero otherwise.
During the survey, students took tests in many subjects. The variable test score (g)
was created using the average of the IRT Theta Score obtained by the student across
the following subjects: reading, mathematics, science, and history/citizenship/geogra-
phy. After taking the average, the variable was discretized using the four quartiles
levels within each period. Students who worked while in high school reported hourly
wages. The variable high-school wage (w) is the weekly rate, computed using the
hourly wage and assuming the sutdent worked twenty hours per week.
In the fourth follow-up of the survey, students reported their educational level.
The variable college (dc) was set equal to one if the student obtained a bachelors
degree or higher by the time of the fourth follow-up. Otherwise, the variable is
equal to zero. In this last follow-up, individuals also reported wages received in their
current or most recent job. The variable wage (W ) is the weekly wage reported by
the individual. The variable was later separated in two, WHS and WC , according to
the educational level obtained by the student (high-school diploma, HS, or bachelors
degree, C).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays averages for the variables study, participation in athletics, partic-
ipation in clubs, and work, during sophomore and senior years. The most popular
among the four choices is athletics. Approximately 70.0% of the students participated
in sports while in their sophomore year, and 61.3% participated in the activity during
senior year. Participation in clubs was 36.4% during sophomore year and 46.1% dur-
ing senior year. Almost one-fth of students worked when sophomores, while about
two-fths decided to work during the senior year. 22.5% of students reported having
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studied more than ve hours per week while sophomores. Students increased their
study time, on average, as seniors, when 37.3% of students reported spending more
than ve hours per week studying outside the classroom.
Cross-participation rates in athletics, clubs and labor market are presented in
Table 2. The most common combination is clubs and athletics. While 26.6% of
sophomores reported to have participated in both activities, 31.2% of students chose
to participate in both activities in the later years of high school. Also, there is an
increase in participation in all activities during the last two years of study. On the
other hand, the group of students who did not participate in any of these three
activities shrinks by about thirty percent. It is important to notice that students are
reducing their leisure time from one year to another. The distribution of leisure time
chosen in each period is presented in Table 3.
Student participation is persistent during the high-school years, as students who
participate in a given activity in the rst period are more likely to participate in the
same activity in the second period. Table 4 displays the transition rates for athletics,
clubs and work. The strong persistence in athletics and clubs (about 78%) is evidence
that either the students may have heterogeneous preferences over these two activities
or that two years of experience is more valuable than one year of experience.
During high school, the average weekly wage received by those who worked was
96.29 dollars during sophomore year and 116.65 dollars in senior year, an increase
of 21.1% (see Table 5). This di¤erence may reect an increase in the productivity
of labor between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. Average test scores were 54.05
and 57.77 for sophomores and seniors, respectively (see Table 6). The increase of
about seven percent in the average test score can be interpreted as an accumulation
26
of knowledge between periods2 and is accompanied by an increase of 14.8 percentage
points in the number of students who said they had studied more than ve hours per
week outside the classroom. Table 7 displays the distribution of scores by activity
and period. In both periods, students who studied or participated in clubs were more
likely to obtain scores above the median of the distribution. Those who participated in
athletics do not obtain scores much di¤erent than the average student in the sample.
Individuals who worked during high school were more likely to be in the bottom of
the test score distribution. This pattern is more evident in the the rst period than
in the second.
Eight years after high-school graduation, in 2000, 44.7% of the individuals had
obtained a bachelors degree. Table 8 presents the same statistic conditional on having
participated for at least one year in each of the extracurricular activities. Those who
participated in athletics or clubs obtained a bachelors degree more often than the
average student (49.7% and 54.7%, respectively). Students with working experience
were less likely to obtain a bachelors degree, 33.5%.
Table 9 presents the average weekly wages in 2000 by educational level and con-
ditional on having participated in extracurricular activities. On average, individuals
who obtained a bachelors degree received a wage premium of 26.3% over the wages re-
ceived by individuals with only a high-school diploma. Additionally, students who had
participated in clubs received a wage premium of about 8.6% compared to the wages
of those who had not participated. Working during high school, however, seems to
harm the wages of those holding a bachelors degree, leading to below-average wages.
Students who had participated in athletics received the highest wage premium among
2For details about the IRT Test and the IRT Theta Score please refer to Second Follow-up:
Student Component Data File Users Manual ( Ingels, S. J., Dowd, K. L., Baldridge, J. D., Stipe, J.
L., Bartot, V. H.; Frankel, M. R., 1994).
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college graduates. The di¤erence between average weekly wages of those who had par-
ticipated in athletics and those who had not is 25.9%. This di¤erence is of the same
magnitude as the college premium (26.3%).
Average wages conditional on participation in athletics and clubs are higher among
those who decided to enter the labor market right after high-school graduation. While
the di¤erence for those who had participated in athletics is about 4%, this di¤erence
is 1.7% for those who had participated in clubs. Finally, working experience seems
to be very important for high-school graduates who do not go to college. Wages are
15% higher among those who have at least one year of experience during high school.
While working seems to hurt test scores early, working experience seems to pays o¤
for those entering the labor market.
3.4 OLS Regressions
Descriptive statistics suggest signicant returns to participation in extracurricular ac-
tivities as shown in average weekly wages. In order to obtain a more precise measure
of the magnitude of the e¤ects of experiences in extracurricular activities on adult
wages, the results of regressions of log-wages on experience and selected observed
variables is presented in Table 10. Regressing log-wages on test scores and experience
(one or two periods) in each activity show that returns to two periods of participation
in athletics or working are correlated with about 16% higher wages eight years after
nishing high school. This number is about 5% for experience in organized school
clubs. After controlling for the post-secondary educational level (dummy variable for
bachelors degree), a measure of self-esteem, family background, and school charac-
teristics, the magnitude of the returns are lower for participation in athletics (about
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10%) and zero for participation in school clubs.3 Work experience, however, still
demonstrates strong returns to wages at the age of 26. Those who worked for one
period receive on average a wage premium of 8%, while those who worked for two
periods obtain an average wage premium of 20%.
The returns to participation in athletics and clubs seem to be di¤erent between
those who received college degrees and those holding only a high-school diploma.
Experience in extracurricular activities is more likely to increase future income for
those who received college degrees, while it seems to be less important for those
holding only a high-school diploma. At the same time, work experience is more
important for those who do not pursue a college degree. Table 11 reports the returns
to participation in extracurricular activities when regressions are estimated separately
for college graduates and those with a high-school diploma only, after controlling for
self-esteem, family background, and school characteristics. Results show that two
periods of experience in athletics increases the wages of college graduates by 17%
and wages of students with only a high-school diploma by 7%. The same level of
experience in the workplace increases wages of college graduates by 19% and wages
of those who completed only high school by 22%. Returns to participation in clubs
are not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Because participation in extracurricular activities and future educational level
(to attend college) are choices and students potentially have di¤erent preferences, a
simple regression of log-wages on participation in athletics and clubs may lead to
3Table 10 presents the results of regressing the log-weekly wages in 2000 on the quartiles of test
scores, and on dummies for accumulated experience in athletics, clubs, and work. The additional
variables included in specications (2) through (5) are a dummy if the student has a college degree
(variable f4hhdg in NELS88), a measure of self-esteem (variable f2locus1), family background (a
measure of socio-economic status, number of siblings and a dummy that is equal to one if the
mother has a college degree or higher, variables bys32, f2ses and bys34b), and school characteristics
(dummies if the school is private, urban, or rural, variables g12ctrl1 and g12urbn3).
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a biased estimate due to self-selection. Suppose, for example, that students who
are more productive in the labor market are also the ones who derive higher utility
from participation in sports, due to some unobserved characteristic. Then, a simple
OLS regression of wages on participation in sports would overestimate the e¤ects
of participation in sports on wages, leading to biased results. The model and the
estimation method presented in Chapter 2 attempt to eliminate the e¤ect of this bias
caused by the self-selection problem, and the results are presented in Chapter 4. The
NELS88 survey, however, imposes some limitations on the estimation method and
the assumptions made to obtain identication are presented in the section below.
3.5 Data Restrictions and Identication Issues
After including the 27 parameters that allow for unobserved heterogeneity and the
3 type-proportion parameters, the structural model has 94 parameters. The total
number of estimated parameters is 88. One particular data restriction - not observing
a long series of wages during adulthood - implies that ve parameters have to be xed:
, HS1 , 
HS
2 , 
C
1 , and 
C
2 . Parameter  is the discount rate and its value is set equal
to 0:97. Parameters HS1 , 
HS
2 , 
C
1 , and 
C
2 are taken from Heckman, Lochner and
Todd (2003). The values are: HS1 = 
C
1 = 0:1301 and 
HS
2 = 
C
2 =  0:0023:4
The identication of the model is obtained as follows. The identication of the re-
maining parameters on the wage proles (H ; C ; H2; 2C) are obtained by observing
variation in the wages received by students in 2000, when they are twenty-six years
4It is not possible to estimate these parameters because NELS88 does not contain information
about wages during adulthood, except in 2000. The survey ends in 2000 when most students are 26
years old. Even if the survey observed wages in all years before 2000, estimation of these parameters
would lead to a very steep wage prole, as most salaries increase fast in the initial years in the
labor force. Such feature is not obtained in long-term wage proles, as observed, for example, in the
salaries of individuals in the Decennial Censuses. This is the reason why these parameters are taken
from Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003).
30
old and by assuming that the shocks on log-wages during adulthood are normally
distributed, identifying 18 parameters. Identication of C is obtained by imposing
normally distributed errors and observing the educational choice, dc, for each individ-
ual. This identication, however, is not obtained without normalizing the standard
deviation of the shock, c, as in a probit model. Therefore, c is normalized to 2,000.
The parameters of the grading process in the rst and second periods are obtained
from observing variation in the scores in both periods and from imposing an ordered
probit specication, identifying 15 parameters. The variance of the test scores in
both periods was normalized to one. Imposing log-normality on the distribution of
wages during high school and observing the wages for those who worked leads to the
identication of the high-school wage functions intercepts and variances, for a total
of 4 parameters.
The utility function parameters describing the preferences of the base-type ( 1;
 2; 1s, and 2s) in periods one and two are identied by imposing a multivariate
normal distribution on the preference shocks and from observing the decisions made
by students and their consequent leisure time choices in the rst two periods (for a
total of 10 parameters). This information also helps to identify the ten parameters
in : Because the matrix of shocks is constant between periods one and two, and
because sixteen di¤erent choices are observed in each period, it is possible to identify
all elements in the variance-covariance matrix, since we have sixteen alternatives and
only 10 elements in the matrix. The only requirement is that we observe groups of
individuals choosing all sixteen alternatives in both periods in the data.
There are 30 parameters left. They are the 27 unobserved heterogeneity parame-
ters and the 3 type-proportion parameters. The unobserved heterogeneity parameters
are identied, as are the parameters for the base-type (type 1), by observing varia-
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tions in studentschoices between periods one and two. The distribution of types is
identied by imposing the restriction that 1 < 2 < 3. This restriction, however,
does not have to be imposed during the estimation process, as types can always be
relabeled after estimation.
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Chapter 4
Estimation Results
This Chapter presents the results of the structural estimation1. Tables 12 to 18 report
the parameter estimates and standard deviations, and Tables 19 to 27 present the
model t and chi-square statistics for selected moments of the data.
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 12 displays the parameters of the wage functions during adulthood for individ-
uals with a bachelors degree and with only a high-school diploma. High-school scores
contribute to wages if the individual earns a bachelors degree, resulting in an increase
of about 1.7% on wages. The same return on scores is not obtained by individuals
with a only high-school diploma. Participating in athletics is estimated to increase
wages by 3.6% for students with two years of experience and 6.7% for those who
participated during four years of high-school, if they nish college. Wage di¤erentials
for students holding a high-school diploma are of smaller magnitude, 1.2% and 4.2%,
for those who participated for two and four years, respectively. This result implies
that experience in athletic extracurricular activities is more important to individuals
1The maximum log-likelihood achieved was -15,540.
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who nish college than to those who enter the job market right after graduating from
high school. Additionally, persistence in athletic activities pays o¤. Students get a
higher increase in wages by participating in sports during four years of high school,
instead of only two years, in both wage proles.
Among college graduates, estimates show that the wage premium for participation
in school clubs is 2.7% for the rst two years of experience, and 5.7% for a total of
four years of experience. Returns to participation in clubs are lower among students
holding only a high-school diploma. Two years of experience lead to an extra 1.3% of
wages, while four years increase wages by 3.9%. Overall, experience in school clubs
is less valuable than experience in athletics. As in athletic activities, skills learned
in school clubs are more valuable to college graduates than to students who get only
a high-school diploma, and persistence leads to higher returns. Working experience,
however, is more valuable if the individual enters the labor market right after high-
school graduation. For this group of individuals, two years of experience increases
wages by 4.1%, while four years of experience leads to a wage premium of 7.6%. For
individuals with a bachelors degree these numbers are 0.08% and 2.9%, respectively.
Parameters representing unobserved heterogeneity in adult wages can be inter-
preted as an absolute advantage. Individuals who are more likely to receive higher
wages if they obtain a bachelors degree are also more likely to receive higher wages
if they work in jobs requiring only a high-school diploma, when compared to the
base-type individual. That type of individual is also more likely to have strong pref-
erences for participation in athletics, as will be discussed later in this section. On
the other hand, conditional on test scores and experience levels, students who have
strong preferences for participating in clubs are more likely to receive lower wages
than individual type 1 in both educational levels.
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Tables 13 and 14 show the parameter estimates for wages during high school and
test scores. Wages increase during the high-school years, possibly due to an increase
in the productivity of labor between periods (which is not in the model). Test scores
increase with study time and participation in clubs and decrease with participation
in sports and work during the rst two years of high school. In the latter two years,
studying and participating in clubs still help scores, participating athletic activities
still has a negative e¤ect, but working no longer a¤ects scores. Additionally, the
quartile of the test score received in the rst two years positively a¤ects the quartile
of the score obtained in the last two years of high school. These results can be
interpreted as evidence that skills acquired in clubs help the development of cognitive
skills measured in test scores, while skills acquired in athletic activities or in part-
time jobs are detrimental to the acquisition of cognitive skills and result in lower test
scores.
The utility function parameters are presented in Tables 15 and 16. Parameters
(1; 2; 3; 4; and C) indicate that all activities are costly (parameters are negative)
for all individuals. In the rst period, working is the costliest activity, followed by
participation in clubs, participation in sports, and studying. In the second period,
participating in sports is the costliest activity, followed by working, participation
in clubs, and studying. Relative to the type-1 student, students with lower utility
costs from participation in athletics (type 2) have higher utility costs from obtaining
a bachelors degree and derive lower utility levels from participation in clubs and
working, but they have stronger preferences for studying. Individuals with strong
preferences for clubs (type 3) derive lower utility levels from participating in sports,
working, and obtaining a bachelors degree, but, their disutility from studying is the
lowest among all types. Finally, when compared to the base type students, individuals
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with lower disutility from working (type 4) have higher disutility from participating
in sports or clubs or from studying. The estimated distribution of types is presented
in Table 17, and the variance-covariance matrix parameters are presented in Table
18.
4.2 Model Fit
In general, the model predictions do well when compared to selected sample moments.
Table 19 presents the simulated participation rates in activities by schooling year.
The model captures the patterns of study choices, participation in extracurricular
activities and work, as well as most of the cross-participation rates (Table 20). Based
on the chi-square measure of goodness of t, the results underestimate the number of
students simultaneously participating in clubs and working in sophomore year and the
proportion of students simultaneously participating in athletics, clubs and working
in the senior year. The model is able to t most of the moments related to the
distribution of the number of activities in which students participated by schooling
year (Table 21) and the transition rates between activities from sophomore to senior
year (Tables 22A, 22B and 22C). The model, however, fails to match the transition
rates from clubs to work, work to clubs, and work to athletics. The model also
underestimates the persistence rate in participation in clubs.
Simulated results t the distribution of test scores conditional on participation in
extracurricular activities reasonably well (Tables 23A, 23B and 23C). In particular,
the model captures the fact that students who study or participate in clubs obtain
higher scores than those who participate in sports or work. Statistically, however,
the model is not able to capture fully the negative skewness in the distribution of
scores of those who studied. The simulated average wages during high school and
36
their standard deviations are presented in Table 24. Average wages match the data,
but the model underestimates the standard deviations. The specication does a good
job matching the bachelors degree rate conditional on choices (Table 25). The model,
however, underestimates the graduation rate for those who worked during high school.
Tables 26A, 26B and 26C present the distribution of cumulative experience in ath-
letics, clubs, and work for the sample data and for the simulated data by educational
level (high-school diploma vs. bachelors degree) together with its chi-square statis-
tics. At rst glance, the model looks to t well the distribution of experience. But,
an analysis of the chi-square statistics reveals that for those with only a high-school
diploma the model underestimates the cumulative experience in clubs and in the
workplace. Additionally, among individuals holding a bachelors degree, the model
overestimates the level of experience students will have in athletic activities.
Finally, Table 27 shows the average wages in the sample and in the simulation,
conditional on participation in activities. The model captures wage levels and the
di¤erences in wages reasonably well. For those with a bachelors degree, the model
seems to capture the wage premium for athletes and for those with experience in
clubs. However, for this same group of individuals, the simulation delivers a positive
wage di¤erential for those who have working experience. This feature is not present
in the sample data. For individuals holding only a high-school diploma, the model
captures the wage di¤erentials and ts the sample data reasonably well. The model
does a poor job, however, generating the larger di¤erences observed in the sample
data. In particular, the simulation does not generate the one-hundred dollar wage
premium experienced by students who worked during high school and earned only a
high-school diploma.
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Chapter 5
Counterfactual Experiments
Having estimated the structural model parameters governing preferences and out-
comes, it is possible to evaluate the impact of changes in public policies during high-
school years on choices during high school, the choice of educational level (bachelors
degree), and wages during adulthood. In each experiment, the model is simulated
under the new policy and a new set of decisions and outcomes is obtained. Be-
cause structural parameters are primitives in the model, they are invariant to policy
changes.1
This chapter presents the results of four policy experiments2. The rst three
experiments investigate the e¤ect of the availability of sports and clubs during high
school. These policy experiments aim to measure the long-term consequences of
proposed cuts in high school budgets, which usually have extracurricular activities
as prime candidates for cutbacks. This situation has become more common recently,
with school districts facing substantial budget cuts across the country. Budget cuts
1It is important to mention that the counterfactual experiments are conducted using parameters
estimated using a selected sample of white male individuals. The results obtained in the experiments
may not be the same for females or individuals of other ethnic groups, as they may have di¤erent
preferences or face di¤erent choices or distribution of shocks during adolescence.
2Each simulated sample has 5,000 students.
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have a¤ected small and large districts. The Los Angeles Unied School District, for
example, expects to face a twenty-percent loss in its high-school athletic funding in
the coming school year.3 The Inter-Lakes School (at the Inter-Lakes School District,
in New Hampshire) is planning to cut $1,150,940 in expenditure, which are "expected
to be felt in virtually every school and at every grade level."4 As a result, the high-
school newspaper will be eliminated. These experiments aim to replicate this type of
situation.
The fourth experiment intends to estimate the consequences of policies that pro-
vide income to students who perform better in exams. Public policies that give prizes
to students who obtain better test scores, grades, or other measures of achievement
have recently been implemented in schools in Chicago, Washington, and New York.
The immediate results in terms of grades and scores, however, are mixed.5 This ex-
periment aims to measure the long-run consequences for studentsincome, given the
trade-o¤ between study time and time spend in extracurricular activities during high
school.
5.1 Counterfactual 1: Eliminating Clubs
In this rst counterfactual exercise, students no longer have the option to participate
in clubs. The change in the choice set aims to replicate a situation in which schools
face a budget cut in which they have to reduce their investment in extracurricular
activities: in particular they have to eliminate clubs. In this version of the model,
students face fewer options, as participation in clubs is no longer available.
3As reported by Sondheimer (2010) for Los Angeles Times.
4As reported by Tunning (2010) for Citizen.com.
5See Fryer (2010) for a detailed description of the programs and their results.
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Because participation in clubs a¤ects future outcomes, students anticipate the con-
sequences of not having the opportunity to accumulate experience and make di¤erent
choices while in high school. The results of interest are participation in activities
during high-school, test scores, the rate at which students obtain bachelors degrees,
and average wages during adulthood.
Table 28 shows studentsparticipation rates in activities in the original model and
under the case in which clubs are no longer available. Students change their choices
towards the accumulation of working experience. In both periods there is a decrease
in the number of individuals who study or participate in sports, while the number of
students working increases. The consequence of eliminating clubs on the distribution
of test scores is presented in Tables 29A and 29B. Even conditioning on having studied,
test scores decrease, and the distribution becomes more positively skewed after clubs
are no longer available. At the same time, the number of students choosing to obtain
a bachelors degree decreases from 43.9% to 28.6% and are as low as 19.7% for those
who worked at least one period during high school (Table 30). Finally, wages during
adulthood decrease in almost every conditional category of participation during high
school, with bigger drops among those who obtain a bachelors degree (Table 31).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Because the payo¤ for obtaining
experience in participation in clubs had been higher for those who actually ended up
obtaining a bachelors degree, the option of getting a degree becomes less valuable
than entering the labor market right after nishing high school. Anticipating that,
students are more likely to work during high school and decrease their participation in
athletics. Test scores decrease as a consequence of these choices. Hence, policy makers
and school district managers should be aware that public policies that eliminate
expenses on school clubs may lead to lower test scores, fewer of students untimately
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obtaining a bachelors degree, and lower wages during adulthood. An analysis of the
lifetime value lost by the average student reveals that individuals should be willing
to pay up to 790 dollars per month during the four years of high school to have the
opportunity to participate in school clubs.
5.2 Counterfactual 2: Eliminating Sports
In the second counterfactual exercise, students no longer have the opportunity to
participate in athletics. The same set of outcomes (choices, scores, college rates and
adulthood wages) is analyzed below.
The results of eliminating the opportunity for students to participate in sports are
in the same direction of those in Counterfactual 1. More students choose to work, and
fewer students decide to study or participate in clubs (Table 32). Test scores decrease
(Tables 33A and 33B), and the bachelors degree attainment decrease by more than
50% (Table 34). Additionally, at the age of 26, average adult wages decrease more
than 5% for those with a bachelors degree and more than 2% for those with only a
high-school diploma (Table 35). This decrease in wages, together with a lower rate
of earning bachelors degrees, decreases the expected discounted value of students
future income. In fact, according to the model predictions, studentswould be willing
to pay up to $1,233 per month for the opportunity to participate in sports.
Results of Counterfactual 1 and 2 reveal that students change their choices as
a result of the lack of opportunities to acquire experience through participation in
school clubs and sports. A more dramatic experiment would eliminate extracurricular
activities all together. This possibility is investigated in Counterfactual 3.
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5.3 Counterfactual 3: Eliminating Sports and Clubs
The third counterfactual aims to analyze the consequences of eliminating both types
of extracurricular activities at the same time. The results are presented in Tables 36,
37A, 37B, 38, and 39. The consequences are similar to the ones in Counterfactuals
1 and 2. More students choose to work during high school, test scores decrease,
and bachelors degree attainment decreases to only 15%. Wages for those holding a
bachelors degree are 8% lower, while this decrease is about 2% for individuals holding
only a high-school diploma. The nal result is a combination of the consequences of
Counterfactuals 1 and 2, and the decrease in future income is larger. According to
the model, the lifetime value lost by the average student is such that they would pay
up to $1,500 per month during the four years of high school to get extracurricular
activities back in schools.
5.4 Counterfactual 4: Paying for Better Scores
The fourth counterfactual estimates the e¤ects of a policy that gives $700 dollars per
period to students who obtain a score above the median of the test score distribution.
As before, the results of interest are participation in activities during high school, test
scores, the rate at which students obtain a bachelors degree, and the average wages
during adulthood.
Table 40 reports studentsparticipation rates in activities in the original model
and after the introduction of the policy. With the policy, the number of students
spending more than 5 hours a week studying at home and participating in clubs
increases, while the number of students who work decreases. Participation rates in
athletics remain basically unchanged.
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The e¤ects of the policy on the distribution of test scores are presented in Tables
41A and 41B. As a consequence of the increases in study and participation in clubs
and the decline in the number of students working, test scores increase, and about
55% of the students obtain scores that would be above the median of the original test
score distribution. The number of students choosing to obtain a bachelors degree
increases from 43.9% to 50.3% (Table 42). Finally, wages during adulthood increase
slightly among those who decide to get a bachelors degree (Table 43).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Students anticipate that if on top
of studying more they increase their participation in clubs they will be more likely
to receive the $700 payment. Because the payo¤ for obtaining better test scores
and experience in participation in clubs is higher for those who actually end up
obtaining a bachelors degree, it increases their lifetime value of obtaining a college
degree, increasing the rate of students who obtain a bachelors degree. The wages
by educational level do not increase much conditional on experience, but the average
wage for all students increase, because more students now have a bachelors degree.
The average weekly wage increases by about 2%.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation develops and estimates a structural dynamic decision model in which
individuals decide about participation in extracurricular activities, study time, and
employment during high school. The specication allows for returns to participation
in extracurricular activities on salaries and unobserved heterogeneity in students
preferences over study time, extracurricular activities, employment during high school
and the acquisition of a bachelors degree. The empirical results suggest that the
model is able to replicate most of the patterns in the data well. Results show that
participation in extracurricular activities increase wages during adulthood as much
as 6.7%. Additionally, results show that while participation in school clubs increases
test scores, working or participating in sports in the last two years of high school may
harm test scores.
Having estimated the parameters governing preferences and outcomes, four di¤er-
ent public policies were analyzed. The rst three experiments investigate the e¤ect
of eliminating clubs, athletic and both activities simultaneously. These policy ex-
periment aim to measure the long-term consequences of proposed cuts in high-school
budgets, which often mark extracurricular activities as prime candidates for cutbacks.
The results are the following: public policies that eliminate expenses in extracurric-
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ular activities lead to lower test scores, fewer students obtaining a bachelors degree,
and lower wages during adulthood. The fourth experiment intends to estimate the
consequences of policies that transfer income to students who perform better on ex-
ams. Results show that a policy that pays $700 dollars to every student who obtains
a score above the median of the test distribution increases test scores and the number
of students obtaining a bachelors degree.
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Table 1: Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Study 22.50 37.28
Athletics 69.97 61.28
Clubs 36.42 46.13
Work 19.20 40.69
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Table 2: Cross-Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Athletics and Clubs 26.61 31.25
Athletics and Work 12.10 21.28
Clubs and Work 6.24 16.10
Athletics, Clubs and Work 3.94 9.65
None 15.41 10.88
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Table 3: Number of Activities
Sophomores Seniors
One Activity 47.52 39.79
Two Activities 33.12 39.68
Three Activities 3.95 9.65
None 15.41 10.88
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Table 4: Transition Rates
Athletics Clubs Work
Athletics 78.13 48.78 37.65
Clubs 65.45 78.18 37.19
Work 57.50 40.83 65.83
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Table 5: Average Weekly Wages during High School
Sophomores Seniors
Wage 96.29 116.65
Std. Dev 51.15 60.85
N 360 763
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Table 6: IRT Theta Scores during High School
Sophomores Seniors
Mean 54.05 57.77
Std. Dev. 8.09 8.62
Min. 28.17 31.79
Max 71.73 78.45
Median 54.71 58.55
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Table 7: Test Scores Distribution by Activity Participation
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 12.09 23.63 15.67 32.78 18.03 22.63 18.15 30.28
2nd 22.75 25.61 21.38 25.00 21.60 24.98 20.92 26.73
3rd 28.49 26.37 27.82 22.22 28.75 27.85 27.17 23.20
4th 36.49 24.39 35.14 20.00 31.62 24.54 33.76 19.79
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Table 8: Bachelors Degree Attainment by Activity Participation
%
Athletics 49.79
Clubs 54.73
Work 33.52
All Sample 44.74
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Table 9: Average Weekly Wages by Experience and Educational Level
High School Diploma Bachelors Degree
Athletics
Participated 688.12 886.25
Not 662.00 703.66
Clubs
Participated 686.66 882.92
Not 675.02 813.02
Work
Worked 720.83 841.47
Not 626.62 869.01
All
680.18 859.26
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Table 10: OLS Estimates Ln(Wage) Equation
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 6.2589 6.2745 6.2910 6.2748 6.2622
(0.0507) (0.0504) (0.0505) (0.0576) (0.0596)
Test Scores 0.0184 -0.0167 -0.0220 -0.0276 -0.0289
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Exp. Atheltics = 1 0.0604 0.0465 0.0467 0.0399 0.0380
(0.0428) (0 0423) (0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0424)
Exp. Athletics = 2 0.1669 0.1167 0.1155 0.1078 0.1015
(0.0348) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0351) (0.0353)
Exp. Clubs = 1 0.0268 0.0066 0 0031 0.0002 -0.0014
(0.0352) (0.0349) (0.0347) (0.0345) (0.0343)
Exp. Clubs = 2 0.0499 0.0212 0.0145 0.0047 0.0011
(0.0364) (0.0363) (0.0362) (0.0364) (0 0367)
Exp. Work = 1 0.0430 0.0739 0.0738 0.0792 0.0812
(0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0319)
Exp. Work = 2 0.1644 0.1963 0.1935 0.2008 0.2024
(0.0393) (0.0390) (0 0386) (0.0387) (0.0388)
Bachelors Degree 0.2255 0.2163 0.1859 0.1790
(0.0313) (0.0316) (0.0330) (0.0331)
Self-Esteem X X X
Family Background X X
School Characteristics X
N 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673
R2 0.0229 0.0501 0.0540 0.0592 0.0624
F-Stat. (K,N-K-1) 5.89 11.51 11.03 9.21 7.67
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses.
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Table 11: OLS Estimates Ln(Wage) Equation by Educational Level
Covariates (1) (2)
Intercept 6.3255 6.2871
(0.0753) (0.1050)
Test Scores -0.0424 -0.0087
(0.0198) (0.0242)
Exp. Atheltics = 1 -0.0417 0.2170
(0.0515) (0.0735)
Exp. Athletics = 2 0.0771 0.1782
(0.0424) (0.0636)
Exp. Clubs = 1 -0.0075 0.0054
(0.0428) (0.0554)
Exp. Clubs = 2 -0.0141 0.0090
(0.0533) (0.0519)
Exp. Work = 1 0.1371 -0.0124
(0.0410) (0.0501)
Exp. Work = 2 0.2225 0.1901
(0.0491) (0.0647)
Self-Esteem X X
Family Background X X
School Characteristics X X
N 906 767
R2 0.0428 0.0548
F-Stat. (K,N-K-1) 2.70 3.60
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses.
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Table 12: Wage Proles
WHS WC
Intercept (0) 5.3900 5.9514
(0.0633) (0.0831)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (82, 92) 0.0026 0.0071
(0.0110) (0.057)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (83, 93) -0.0079 -0.0052
(0.0132) (0.086)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (84, 94) 0.0022 0.0002
(0.0184) (0.015)
Scores (3) 0.0044 0.0170
(0.0038) (0.0025)
Exp. Athletics = 1 (4) 0.0124 0.0362
(0.0341) (0.0211)
Exp. Athletics = 2 (5) 0.0427 0.0675
(0.0332) (0.0204)
Exp. Clubs = 1 (6) 0.0137 0.0276
(0.0234) (0.0145)
Exp. Clubs = 2 (7) 0.0399 0.0579
(0.0460) (0.0284)
Exp. Work = 1 (8) 0.0410 0.0077
(0.0247) (0.0152)
Exp. Work = 2 (9) 0.0765 0.0288
(0.0277) (0.0302)
Std. Dev. (2HS, 
2
C) 0.5721 0.5852
(0.1891) (0.1841)
57
Table 13: High-School Wages
Sophomores Seniors
Intercept (wt) 4.4209 4.6412
(0.3166) (0.3161)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (62) -0.0101
(0.1628)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (63) -0.0098
(0.1733)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (64) 0.0069
(0.1736)
HS Wage Std. Dev (2t) 0.4340 0.3905
(0.2445) (0.1254)
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Table 14: Test Scores
Sophomores Seniors
Score in t  1 (0) - 1.3704
(0.1502)
Study (1) 0.4343 0.4943
(0.0276) (0.0258)
Part. in Athletics (2) -0.0501 -0.4661
(0.0392) (0.0400)
Part. in Clubs (3) 0.4278 0.2300
(0.0325) (0.0330)
Working (4) -0.1426 -0.1676
(0.03879) (0.0337)
Intercept 1 (1) -0.5144 1.9918
(0.0585) (0.5903)
Intercept 2 (2) 0.1783 3.4112
(0.0585) (0.5912)
Intercept 3 (3) 0.9088 4.7817
(0.0586) (0.5927)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (72) 0.02757
(0.0618)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (73) 0.04218
(0.0644)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (74) -0.03171
(0.0726)
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Table 15: First and Second-Period Utility Function
Sophomores Seniors
Leisure ( ) 46.2670 50.2556
(24.9559) (15.3608)
Study Type 1 (1) -431.8265 -223.3407
(133.5025) (132.5548)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (12) 16.0288
(137.7338)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (13) 28.1681
(145.9075)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (14) -27.8922
(160.7079)
Part. in Athletics Type 1 (2) -667.9982 -857.2047
(434.4340) (440.30)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (22) 358.1105
(397.9374)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (23) -154.6604
(422.9212)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (24) 55.1001
(453.7270)
Part. in Clubs Type 1 (3) -1,091.0698 -809.5591
(477.6131) (480.3632)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (32) -158.0102
(469.9277)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (33) 278.0013
(415.0422)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (34) 19.0246
(516:6749)
Working Type 1 (4) -1,102.1523 -853.2133
(455.5958) (459.8158)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (42) -161.1918
(461.9802)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (43) -123.8164
(457.3783)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (44) 390.0222
(413.6932)
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Table 16: Third-Period Utility Function
Parameter
Bachelor Degree Type 1 (C) -16,096.0074
(2,634.4742)
Di¤. Type 2 - Type 1 (52) -138.1181
(155.1608)
Di¤. Type 3 - Type 1 (53) -97.0964
(196.1260)
Di¤. Type 4 - Type 1 (54) 2.0128
(20.2775)
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Table 17: Distribution of Types
%
Type 1 (1) 10.0507
Type 2 (2) 50.8952
Type 3 (3) 25.7620
Type 4 (4) 13.2921
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Table 18: Vaiance-Covariance Matrix
Value Std. Dev.
Std. Dev. Study (s) 431.9505 153.3420
Std. Dev. Athletics (a) 339.8556 142.1868
Std. Dev. Clubs (b) 420.5623 146.2949
Std. Dev. Work (w) 399.7791 207.1738
Covariance Study and Athletics (2sa) -372.270 128.7944
Covariance Study and Clubs (2sb) 693.681 240.8815
Covariance Study and Work (2sw) 146.671 104.0153
Covariance Athletics and Clubs (2ab) -875.744 299.5988
Covariance Athletics and Work (2aw) 917.794 628.8120
Covariance Clubs and Work (2bw) 790.945 542.4398
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Table 19: Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Sample Simulation 2 Sample Simulation 2
Study 22.50 23.18 0.49 37.28 37.82 0.23
Athletics 69.97 68.58 1.72 61.28 60.60 0.36
Clubs 36.42 35.14 1.32 46.13 45.16 0.71
Work 19.20 20.48 1.98 40.69 41.62 0.67
21;0:01= 6:64
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Table 20: Cross-Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Sample Simulation 2 Sample Simulation 2
Athletics and Clubs 26.61 27.66 1.05 31.25 29.54 2.55
Athletics and Work 12.10 10.98 2.21 21.28 20.18 1.35
Clubs and Work 6.24 4.56 9.04 16.10 13.98 6.23
Athletics, Clubs and Work 3.94 3.28 2.15 9.65 6.98 15.33
None 15.41 15.72 0.13 10.88 9.34 4.58
21;0:01= 6:64
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Table 21: Number of Activities
Sophomores Seniors
Sample Simulation 2 Sample Simulation 2
One Activity 47.52 47.64 0.01 39.79 40.92 0.99
Two Activities 33.12 33.36 0.04 39.68 42.76 7.43
Three Activities 3.95 3.28 2.21 9.65 6.98 15.33
None 15.41 15.72 0.13 10.88 9.34 4.58
21;0:01= 6:64
66
Table 22: Transition Rates
(A) Sample
Athletics Clubs Work
Athletics 78.13 48.78 37.65
Clubs 65.45 78.18 37.19
Work 57.50 40.83 65.83
(B) Simulation
Athletics Clubs Work
Athletics 76.06 47.59 35.96
Clubs 65.85 75.13 32.56
Work 47.75 37.40 66.60
(C) Chi-Square
Athletics Clubs Work
Athletics 4.70 1.06 2.28
Clubs 0.13 10.22 17.21
Work 72.94 9.13 0.49
21;0:01= 6:64
67
Table 23: Test Scores Distribution by Activity Participation
(A) Sample
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 12.09 23.63 15.67 32.78 18.03 22.63 18.15 30.28
2nd 22.75 25.61 21.38 25.00 21.60 24.98 20.92 26.73
3rd 28.49 26.37 27.82 22.22 28.75 27.85 27.17 23.20
4th 36.49 24.39 35.14 20.00 31.62 24.54 33.76 19.79
(B) Simulation
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 15.88 24.38 17.13 30.76 18.35 25.94 17.36 31.81
2nd 20.28 25.31 22.42 26.27 26.81 23.99 22.14 27.63
3rd 27.96 25.46 26.98 23.44 24.59 24.85 27.06 21.48
4th 35.89 24.85 33.47 19.53 30.25 25.21 33.44 19.08
(C) Chi-Square
Sophomore Seniors
Study 27.67 36.07
Athletics 1.26 16.22
Clubs 5.46 2.04
Work 5.00 4.88
23;0:01= 11:35
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Table 24: Average Weekly Wages during High School
Sample Simulation
Sophomores Wage 96.29 96.17
Std. Dev. 51.15 45.83
Seniors Wage 116.65 115.80
Std. Dev. 60.85 48.61
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Table 25: Bachelors Degree Attainment by Activity Participation
Sample Simulation 2
Athletics 49.79 51.67 2.65
Clubs 54.73 56.25 1.74
Work 33.52 29.01 17.11
All Sample 44.74 43.98 0.43
21;0:01 = 6:64
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Table 26: Cumulative Experience by Activity and Educational Level
(A) Sample
Only High-School Diploma Bachelor Degree
Experience Athletics Clubs Work Athletics Clubs Work
0 30.41 55.69 43.15 14.78 33.85 64.60
1 25.68 23.67 41.22 17.28 28.01 26.46
2 43.92 20.66 15.64 67.94 38.14 8.94
(B) Simulation
Only High-School Diploma Bachelor Degree
Experience Athletics Clubs Work Athletics Clubs Work
0 33.56 57.91 38.59 9.50 31.06 68.03
1 24.35 25.53 43.45 25.51 30.01 23.83
2 42.09 16.57 17.96 64.98 38.93 8.14
(C) Chi-Square
High-School Diploma Bachelor Degree
Athletics 8.83 111.28
Clubs 19.58 7.29
Worl 17.75 9.65
22;0:01 =9.21
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Table 27: Average Weekly Wages by Experience and Educational Level
High School Diploma Bachelors Degree
Sample Simulation Sample Simulation
Athletics
Participated 688.12 682.97 886.25 868.10
Not 662.00 680.34 703.66 786.71
Clubs
Participated 686.66 694.62 882.92 871.68
Not 675.02 672.98 813.02 835.27
Work
Worked 720.83 704.72 841.47 877.01
Not 626.62 646.08 869.01 852.55
All
680.18 682.09 859.26 860.37
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Table 28: Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Full Model Conterfactual 1 Full Model Counterfactual 1
Study 23.18 21.28 37.82 36.14
Athletics 68.58 58.72 60.60 51.96
Clubs 35.14 - 45.16 -
Work 20.48 23.88 41.62 48.62
73
Table 29: Test Scores Distribution by Activity Participation
(A) Full Model
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 15.88 24.38 17.13 30.76 18.35 25.94 17.36 31.81
2nd 20.28 25.31 22.42 26.27 26.81 23.99 22.14 27.63
3rd 27.96 25.46 26.98 23.44 24.59 24.85 27.06 21.48
4th 35.89 24.85 33.47 19.53 30.25 25.21 33.44 19.08
(B) Counterfactual 1
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 20.77 30.59 - 34.67 23.24 33.29 - 35.38
2nd 23.50 26.36 - 25.80 28.83 25.25 - 27.31
3rd 26.32 23.47 - 21.27 24.68 22.98 - 20.61
4th 29.42 19.58 - 18.26 23.24 18.48 - 16.70
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Table 30: Bachelors Degree Attainment by Activity Participation
Full Model Counterfactual 1
Athletics 51.67 36.73
Clubs 56.25 -
Work 29.01 19.71
All Sample 43.98 28.64
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Table 31: Average Weekly Wages by Experience and Educational Level
High School Diploma Bachelors Degree
Full Model Counterfactual 1 Full Model Conterfactual 1
Athletics
Participated 682.97 673.38 868.10 844.09
Not 680.34 673.50 786.71 777.86
Clubs
Participated 694.62 - 871.68 -
Not 672.98 - 835.27 -
Work
Worked 704.72 692.69 877.01 855.65
Not 646.08 638.97 852.55 820.34
All
682.09 673.43 860.37 834.20
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Table 32: Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Full Model Conterfactual 2 Full Model Counterfactual 2
Study 23.18 19.44 37.82 34.70
Athletics 68.58 - 60.60 -
Clubs 35.14 18.30 45.16 26.94
Work 20.48 25.74 41.62 52.90
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Table 33: Test Scores Distribution by Activity Participation
(A) Full Model
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 15.88 24.38 17.13 30.76 18.35 25.94 17.36 31.81
2nd 20.28 25.31 22.42 26.27 26.81 23.99 22.14 27.63
3rd 27.96 25.46 26.98 23.44 24.59 24.85 27.06 21.48
4th 35.89 24.85 33.47 19.53 30.25 25.21 33.44 19.08
(B) Counterfactual 2
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 17.08 - 16.72 31.86 17.87 - 15.44 27.52
2nd 22.43 - 23.61 26.34 25.99 - 20.86 26.62
3rd 27.78 - 27.10 22.84 25.07 - 26.06 23.10
4th 32.72 - 32.57 18.96 31.07 - 37.64 22.76
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Table 34: Bachelors Degree Attainment by Activity Participation
Full Model Counterfactual 2
Athletics 51.67 -
Clubs 56.25 30.50
Work 29.01 14.61
All Sample 43.98 19.94
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Table 35: Average Weekly Wages by Experience and Educational Level
High School Diploma Bachelors Degree
Full Model Counterfactual 2 Full Model Conterfactual 2
Athletics
Participated 682.97 - 868.10 -
Not 680.34 - 786.71 -
Clubs
Participated 694.62 685.18 871.68 830.60
Not 672.98 661.93 835.27 788.37
Work
Worked 704.72 683.09 877.01 822.88
Not 646.08 640.02 852.55 799.09
All
682.09 668.68 860.37 809.97
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Table 36: Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Full Model Conterfactual 3 Full Model Counterfactual 3
Study 23.18 19.04 37.82 34.16
Athletics 68.58 - 60.60 -
Clubs 35.14 - 45.16 -
Work 20.48 26.98 41.62 55.42
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Table 37: Test Scores Distribution by Activity Participation
(A) Full Model
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 15.88 24.38 17.13 30.76 18.35 25.94 17.36 31.81
2nd 20.28 25.31 22.42 26.27 26.81 23.99 22.14 27.63
3rd 27.96 25.46 26.98 23.44 24.59 24.85 27.06 21.48
4th 35.89 24.85 33.47 19.53 30.25 25.21 33.44 19.08
(B) Counterfactual 3
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 19.54 - - 33.73 20.20 - - 29.20
2nd 23.63 - - 26.54 27.58 - - 27.79
3rd 25.95 - - 21.57 25.29 - - 22.05
4th 30.88 - - 18.16 26.93 - - 20.971484
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Table 38: Bachelors Degree Attainment by Activity Participation
Full Model Counterfactual 3
Athletics 51.67 -
Clubs 56.25 -
Work 29.01 11.22
All Sample 43.98 14.84
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Table 39: Average Weekly Wages by Experience and Educational Level
High School Diploma Bachelors Degree
Full Model Counterfactual 3 Full Model Conterfactual 3
Athletics
Participated 682.97 - 868.10 -
Not 680.34 - 786.71 -
Clubs
Participated 694.62 - 871.68 -
Not 672.98 - 835.27 -
Work
Worked 704.72 678.83 877.01 798.01
Not 646.08 634.35 852.55 784.27
All
682.09 664.74 860.37 791.08
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Table 40: Participation Rates
Sophomores Seniors
Full Model Conterfactual 4 Full Model Counterfactual 4
Study 23.18 39.62 37.82 43.16
Athletics 68.58 68.38 60.60 60.90
Clubs 35.14 53.38 45.16 53.46
Work 20.48 15.14 41.62 37.96
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Table 41: Test Scores Distribution by Activity Participation
(A) Full Model
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 15.88 24.38 17.13 30.76 18.35 25.94 17.36 31.81
2nd 20.28 25.31 22.42 26.27 26.81 23.99 22.14 27.63
3rd 27.96 25.46 26.98 23.44 24.59 24.85 27.06 21.48
4th 35.89 24.85 33.47 19.53 30.25 25.21 33.44 19.08
(B) Counterfactual 4
Quartile Sophomores Seniors
Study Athletics Clubs Work Study Athletics Clubs Work
1st 14.74 20.42 15.85 26.68 14.50 20.72 13.95 27.92
2nd 18.98 22.70 21.13 26.16 25.35 21.67 20.50 24.82
3rd 27.51 27.00 27.58 23.91 27.29 27.42 29.22 23.92
4th 38.77 29.89 35.44 23.25 32.85 30.18 36.33 23.34
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Table 42: Bachelors Degree Attainment by Activity Participation
Full Model Counterfactual 4
Athletics 51.67 57.97
Clubs 56.25 60.04
Work 29.01 33.31
All Sample 43.98 50.28
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Table 43: Average Weekly Wages by Experience and Educational Level
High School Diploma Bachelors Degree
Full Model Counterfactual 4 Full Model Conterfactual 4
Athletics
Participated 682.97 681.45 868.10 873.14
Not 680.34 680.02 786.71 816.28
Clubs
Participated 694.62 689.22 871.68 878.80
Not 672.98 671.50 835.27 826.80
Work
Worked 704.72 699.07 877.01 907.62
Not 646.08 656.51 852.55 852.48
All
682.09 680.98 860.37 868.14
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Appendix
The sample used in the paper is originally from the National Educational Longitudinal
Study: Base Year Through Fourth Follow-up, 1988-2000 (NELS88). The original data
has 12,144 students who were interviewed in 1988 (base-year), 1990 (rst follow-up),
1992 (second follow-up), 1994 (third follow-up), and 2000 (fourth follow-up). The
inital sample consists of 3,071 white men (f4race=4 and f4sex=1), who had nished
high school by the time of the third follow-up (f4univ1=1126), and stayed in the
same high school over the years (f2f1sc=1). During the construction of variables,
individuals with missing values were dropped from the sample as explained below for
each variable.
Study
The variables study time (d1s; d
2
s) are equal to one if the time spend doing homework
out of school is greater than ve hours per week (f1s36a2>3 & f1s36a2<8) in the
rst follow-up, and if the students spends more than ve hours per week doing home-
work (f2s25f2>3 & f2s25f2<9) in the second follow-up, respectively. Otherwise, the
variables are equal to zero. If the value was missing, the student responded multiple
values, or the student skipped the questions, the observation was dropped.
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Participation in Athletics
The variables participation in athletics (d1a; d
2
a) are equal to one if the student par-
ticipated in baseball/softball (f1s41aa>2 & f1s41aa<7), basketball (f1s41ab>2 &
f1s41ab<7), football (f1s41ac>2 & f1s41ac<7), soccer (f1s41ad>2 & f1s41ad<7),
swimming (f1s41ae>2 & f1s41ae<7), other1 (f1s41af>2 & f1s41af<7), or other2
(f1s41ag>2 & f1s41ag<7) in the rst follow-up, and if he participated in team1
(f2s30aa>2 & f2s30aa<6), ind1 (f2s30ab>2 & f2s30ab<6), team2 (f2s30bj>2 & f2s30bj
<5), or ind2 (f2s30bk>2 & f2s30bk<5) in the second follow-up, respectively. If he
did not participated in any sport, the variables are equal to zero. If there was missing
values or multiple values for all questions, the student skipped all questions, or the
school does not o¤er any athletic activity, the observation was dropped.
Participation in Clubs
The variables participation in clubs (d1b ; d
2
b) are equal to one if the student partici-
pated in the band or orchestra (f1s41ba>2 & f1s41ba<5), theater or musical clubs
(f1s41bb>2 & f1s41bb<5), student government (f1s41bc>2 & f1s41bc<5), newspa-
per or yearbook (f1s41be> 2 & f1s41be<5), or school service clubs (f1s41bf>2 &
f1s41bf<5) in the rst follow-up, and if he participated in the band or orchestra
(f2s30ba>2 & f2s30ba<5), theater or musical clubs (f2s30bb>2 & f2s30bb<5), stu-
dent government (f2s30bc>2 & f2s30bc<5), newspaper or yearbook (f2s30be>2 &
f2s30be<5), or school service clubs (f2s30bf>2 & f2s30bf<5) in the second follow-up,
respectively. If he did not participated in any of the above clubs, the variable is equal
to zero. If there was missing values or multiple values for all questions, the student
skipped all questions, or the school does not o¤er any club activity, the observation
was dropped.
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Work
The variables work (d1w; d
2
w) are equal to one if the student was currently employed
(f1s84=5) and reported to work more than ten hours a week (f1s85>1 & f1s85<6) by
the time of the rst follow-up, and was currently employed (f2s86a=2) and working
more than ten hours per week (f2s88>2 & f2s88<10) by the time of the second follow-
up, respectively. Otherwise, the variables are equal to zero. If the value was missing,
the student responded multiple values, or the student skipped the questions, the
observation was dropped.
College
The variable college (dc) is equal to one if the student obtained a bachelor degree or
higher (f4hhdg>3 & f4hhdg<7) by the time of the fourth follow-up. Otherwise, the
variable is equal to zero. If the value was missing the observation was dropped. All
the cases of students who skipped the question were actually cases of students who
never attended a post secondary institution (f4attpse=2), so their variable college was
set equal to zero as it was a legitimated skip.
Test Scores
The variables test scores (g1; g2) are based on the average IRT Theta Score obtained
by the student on reading (f12xrth), mathematics (f12xmth), science (f12xsth) and
history, citizenship, and geography (f12xhth) IRT Tests during the rst follow-up, and
on reading (f22xrth), mathematics (f22xmth), science (f22xsth) and history, citizen-
ship, and geography (f22xhth) IRT Tests during the second follow-up, respectively.
After taking the averages of the tests, the variable was discretized using the four quar-
tiles levels within each period. If the score was missing or the student did not take
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one of the tests, the observation was dropped. For details about the IRT Test and
the IRT Theta Score please refer to NELS88 Second Follow-up: Student Component
Data File Users Manual (1994).
Wages during High School
The variables wages (w1; w2) are non-missing and positive if the student was currently
employed (f1s84=5) and had reported a hourly wage rate (f1s88) in the rst follow-up,
and was currently employed (f2s86a=2) and had reported a hourly wage rate (f2s91)
by the time of the second follow-up, respectively. The wage rates in the original
survey are categorical. A numerical variable was created using the average of each
category. If the student responded that he worked, but the wage rate was missing,
the student responded multiple values, refused to answer the question, or the student
skipped the question, the observation was dropped. The nal variable, weekly wage
rate, is the hourly rate multiplied by 20.
Wages during Adulthood (2000)
The variable wage in 2000 (W ) was created using the earning period (f4bratp) and
wage rate (f4brate) reported by the student by the time of the fourth follow-up (2000).
The wages were annualized whenever the earning period reported was shorter than a
year (for example, monthly, weekly, etc.). If the individual reported an hourly rate,
the variable was adjusted by the number of hours worked per week (f4bjhpw) reported
by the student, as long as this number was not greater than 50 hours a week. If the
information about the wage rate was missing the observation was dropped.
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